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Nature and Idiom 
Note on the Genealogy of Some of the Underlying 
Options of Jacques Derrida’s Seminars (between 
Heidegger and Nietzsche)1*
What does “world” mean? What does “bêtise” mean?
These two semantic questions, raised by Derrida in The Beast and the Sovereign, intersect one of 
the main motives of this seminar. Namely, the concern for the limit between bestiality and sovereignty, 
between the proper of man and the improper, as it were, of the beast. This limit is traditionally determi-
ned as one between different modalities of expression. This is so if one holds the experience of language 
to be exemplarily representative of experience in general. Thus, the limit between beast and sovereign 
is a limit between modalities of experience: modalities of the being there of what is there, modalities 
according to which what is given gives itself. 
Such is a limit, or a contrast, between configurations of nature.
Such contrast opposes Heidegger to Derrida. Their respective conceptions of expression – “poe-
try” and “literature”, if one wants – confront one another as conceptions of nature. Of this contrast, 
thanks to the publication of earlier Derrida’s seminars (La question de l’Être et l’Histoire, and especially 
La vie la mort)2, it is possible to appreciate the persistence and the genealogy in the latter’s work. In what 
follows we will limit our task to situating and sketching out the emergence of it in Derrida’s last seminar.
I.
The second year of The Beast and the Sovereign begins with the staging of the said contrast. The matter 
in question is the world. What does “world” mean?
For Heidegger this notion must be determined starting from three famous theses: the stone is 
wordless (weltlos). The animal is poor in world (weltarm). Man is word-forming (weltbildend). In this 
1  *  https://doi.org/10.24361/Performa.2020.12.3
2   Jacques Derrida: Heidegger. La question de l’Être et l’Histoire, séminaire 1964-65, Paris, Galilée, 2013; id.: La vie la 
mort, séminaire 1975-76, Paris, Seuil, 2019.
context, the world is defined as “the manifestness (Offenbarkeit) of beings as such in their entirety”3.
According to Heidegger, man has a world. Such world is not an objective totality, a collection of 
objects. It is rather the process or the dynamic structure of an upspring as world. It is, or is traversed by 
the thrust that produces it, that pushes it forward. This thrust, this springing is physis. Nature4.
And this springing or growing is pushed by the force, by the “predominance” that Heidegger 
names Walten. Walten is the force of the growing which defines physis. Or, physis is the Walten of 
everything: of the world, of everything that is, springing as such in its entirety5. Therefore man, the Da-
sein that has the world, does not have it because he owns it, but because, in his turn, is traversed by such 
growing or springing of the world. Traversed by this forming spring which defines him, accordingly, as 
weltbildend. It is as if – not in the stone, not in the animal, but – in the Dasein which can affect itself by 
virtue of it, the Walten could affect itself. Or even recognise itself. This auto-affection is the exposition, 
the taking place of the emergence of something as such in that domain in which something can emerge 
as such: that is, not as an object, but as being6. The domain, the residence of this nostalgic auto-affection 
is logos: the thinking word. Poetry, Dichtung.
“There is no world”. “We are weltlos”7. With three words Derrida annihilates this meditation. 
Such formulations by Derrida refer on the one side to another conception of poetry, of the poem, such he 
had put forward in Béliers, writing after Paul Celan. But on the other side, in the context of the seminar, 
they answer the following question: “what do beasts and men have in common?”8 In common, says Der-
rida, all living beings have a world, but under the form of not having a world. All the living: this means 
that “no animal or human individual inhabits the same world as another”. Nor the same world as itself, 
in fact, since the world is lacking. The finite modality of life, that Derrida calls survie, does not have a 
world. It is world-less or world-lacking. Survie is “en mal de monde”. 
Derrida’s contrast to Heidegger’s perspective on nature and on the force that animates it is quite 
unsurprising: such force is at odds with the weak force of the trace, the force of production and tradition 
of a world that arrives to being, or to itself, only while effacing itself, while disseminating, while forget-
3   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, volume II, seminar 2002-03, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, Chicago and 
London, The University of Chicago Press, 2010, 219; see Jacques Derrida: Séminaire. La bête et le souverain, volume II, 
2002-03, Paris, Galilée, 2009, 306: “la manifestété (Offenbarkeit) de l’étant en tant que tel en son entier”.
4   “Remember that for Heidegger […] physis is not yet objective nature but the whole of the originary world in its appear-
ing and in its originary growing [poussée originaire]”, Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 12.
5   “Walten is dominant, governing power, as self-formed sovereignty, as autonomous, autarcic [sic] force, commanding 
and forming itself, of the totality of beings, beings in their entirety, everything that is. Physis is the Walten of everything, 
which depends, as Walten, only on itself, which forms itself sovereignly, as power, receiving its form and its image [ref-
erence to the Bilden, the Weltbilden which is the proper to man], its figure of domination, from itself” (Jacques Derrida: 
The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 39), ibid. “Heidegger’s definition of logos will always depend tightly on this thinking 
of Walten” (Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 42); as well as the “enigmatic [value of] proximity that 
[thus] becomes the principle of orientation of thought” (Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 63).
6   “Dasein is defined by the drive to questioning, and by a questioning that goes to the heart of the whole of beings as 
such, to the heart of the whole, of the totality of what is, and therefore of the world” (Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the 
Sovereign, vol. II, 107).
7   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 9.
8   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 8.
ting itself. By contrary the Walten, the spring of growing nature, is an “originarily sovereign power”9. 
Of course, for Heidegger this is not the force of an imperturbable essence, but of a conflict, of polemos. 
But, of a polemos as logos: a union in conflict. This force holds the conflict together. On this force depend 
Heidegger’s conception of the world, that of ontological difference, the privilege accorded to the value 
of gathering and of fidelity in memory, a conception of logos and therefore the characteristics or facul-
ties that define the proper of Dasein: i.e. the access to the essence of beings and to death as such. What 
the animal is deprived of, being poor in world, is this opening, this gathering breaching that the Walten 
brings forward. This springing force that holds together the opening by which essence manifests does 
not traverse the beast. Which is therefore stupefied, bored in its dumbness. Encircled, dominated by the 
circuits of its vital programs. By the glass cage of behaviour.
In the last sessions of his seminar Derrida pursuits a reading of these motives which inquires lan-
guage as the place where the Walten manifests. From the offspring, prayer is at stake10. Derrida moves 
off from a passage of Heidegger’s seminar on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, where the lat-
ter quotes Aristotle’s On Interpretation and the classical distinction between apophantic and non-apop-
hantic logos. Apophantic logos is a kind of discourse or proposition that can be true or false and which 
shows, exposes, says Heidegger, what is such as it is. Instead, a non-apophantic logos, such as prayer, 
cannot be true or false. 
Heidegger excludes bluntly prayer from the core of his argument. This exclusion is very trouble-
some for Derrida, according to whom every question and affirmation, every search for or exposure of 
the essence presupposes a performativity that precedes the opposition of true and false as well as any in-
tentionality, a performativity not defined by truth, one that does not mean anything, qui ne veut rien dire. 
Would prayer be animal?
For Heidegger this is not the case. The animal is alogon. It cannot mean or signify anything. 
Instead any logos, apophantic or not, insofar as it is signifying (sémantikos) is founded on convention 
(synthéké). Signifying means “bringing together”: such faculty depends on a power of gathering which 
produces the signifier and the signified altogether, which permits the thinking exposition of a signifi-
cation. Heidegger translates Aristotle’s synthéké into his als-Struktur: the possibility to access being as 
such. Since the beast is incapable to signify conventionally, it cannot “transcend”, says Heidegger, the 
torpor in which it is inhibited11. More: the beast has no access to the shared transcendence which is a 
primary feature of the syn-thetic nature of logos. The logos puts together into the opening in which being 
manifests; and therefore it produces discourse. As a corollary, if a beast is not political this is so on an 
ontological basis. A beast is not properly put together (with others) by logos.
9   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 39.
10   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 202.
11   “The animal does not transcend, as does Dasein, and the movement of transcendence is indeed that on the basis of 
which one has a world as totality of beings as such” (Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 226).
At the end of Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Aristotle one thing rests assured. The beast cannot 
signify, it has no logos whatsoever, and therefore “it can neither speak, nor pray, nor lie”12. Nevertheless, 
prayer holds an instable position here: it is the middle term of a shifting or limping analogy13 between 
animal and man. Not animal, it is not properly the proper of man. Heidegger excludes prayer from his 
consideration since prayer is not concerned by true and false, and most of all by aletheia: by truth as un-
veiling, by the withdrawal from dissimulation (Entbergen) that takes place in or with apophantic logos. 
Derrida insists on this exclusion of prayer as opposed to the apophantic specificity: to withdraw from 
concealment, this is a faculty, a power, and demands a force. For Heidegger this force is force itself, Wal-
ten as the power in language to harbour the exposure of beings as such. To access beings as such means 
to withdraw them from an instrumental, objectal condition and to bring them forward in their relation 
to being. Walten is precisely what produces the conciliation in difference (Austrag) between being and 
beings: “c’est dans l’Austrag que ça waltet”14, muses Derrida. Walten is the force that holds together and 
exposes ontological difference. At the same time, it is in Poetry that it waltet. Walten is the force of the 
production of truth in Poetry15. And Poetry harbours being.
This tautology expresses all of Heidegger’s “logocentrism”. Logocentrism is here a model of per-
formativity, a thought or hope concerning the possibility of performativity which is one with a concep-
tion of physis – and a fortiori of history.
Let us get back to the prayer. Is it animal? “No doubt”.
According to Derrida one could not deny that beasts do have access to some kind of convention, of 
“synthesis”. And on the other hand his criticism of logocentrism implies that man does not access things 
as such. There is no “as such” but perspective, impure. Prayer is exemplary in this respect: a) it is neither 
true nor false, and properly speaking it does not signify anything; b) it is impossible to purify the seman-
tic discourse from the pragmatic layer to which it belongs; c) it is not foreclosed to beasts. This passage 
of Derrida’s is peculiar: in several occasions he assimilates prayer to demand for forgiveness. Pardon, 
repenting, guilty exposition, modesty: Derrida does not deny such movements to beasts16. “There is, no 
12   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 229.
13   We thus interpret what in De l’esprit, Paris, Galilée, 1987, 81, Derrida defines as the “analogie décalée” between Da-
sein’s and animal’s privations, between Heidegger’s Entbehrung and Privation. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby 
render the expression into “discrepant analogy” (Of Spirit, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, 
51). Leonard Lawlor translates it into “staggered analogy” (This Is Not Sufficient, New York, Columbia University Press, 
2007, passim).
14   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 256.
15   “The als, the als-Struktur that distinguishes man from the animal is thus indeed what the violence of Walten makes 
possible. And one will not be surprised to recognize this same violence in the Gewalttätigkeit des dichterischen Sagens, 
in the violence of poetic saying, des denkerischen Entwurfs, the project of thinking, the thinking project, des bauenden 
Bildens, the edifying image (and the Weltbilden of the world for man, as man himself, unlike for the animal, is also a 
Bilden), and finally, what I would have liked to analyze more closely here of des staatschaffenden Handelns, the action 
that creates states” (Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 289, commenting on Heidegger’s Introduction 
to Metaphysics).
16   See Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 231, editors’ note: Derrida refers to the 1st, 4th, 8th sessions 
of his EHESS 1997-98 seminar Le Parjure et le Pardon, published by the Éditions du Seuil in November 2019. See also 
The Animal That Therefore I Am, New York, Fordham University Press, 2008, 60.
doubt, an animal thank you or mercy”, “Il y a sans doute un ‘mercy’ de la bête”17.
Precisely while suggesting that a beastly language of pardon and repenting exists18, Derrida as-
sociates forgiveness and Zusage. That is, according to Derrida’s critical interpretation, to Heidegger’s 
notion of a passive acquiescence: a passive performance that one cannot but consent to when entering the 
realm of language, of signification. A passive affirmation preceding every question. So there is animal 
pardon, belonging to the order of Zusage. And it is radically different from the sovereign “pardon” that 
the Walten gives (Walten vergibt) when it produces the issue or the conciliation (Austrag) of ontological 
difference19.
So for Derrida this non-apophantic logos or layer of logos opens a breach: it entails another model 
of performativity, and another conception of physis.
II.
Derrida exposes the elements of such conception in the very last session of the seminar.
For finite living beings there is no world, “il n’y a pas de monde”:
“radical dissemination [without a common semantic horizon], i.e. the absence of a common wor-
ld, the irremediable solitude without salvation of the living being, depends first on the absence without 
recourse of any world, i.e. of any common meaning of the word ‘world’, in sum of any common mea-
ning at all. This can, I admit, look like a lot of apocalyptic statements, but it is also the very tissue, the 
unwoven tissue [tissu sans tissage], the ever unsewn and torn tissue of our most constant and quotidian 
17   Jacques Derrida: “Pardonner: l’impardonnable et l’imprescriptible” (1997), in Marie-Louise Mallet and Ginette 
Michaud (eds.): Jacques Derrida, Paris, L’Herne, 2004, 558. See Jacques Derrida: “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the 
Imprescriptible”, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, in John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, Michael J. Scanlon (eds.): Questioning 
God, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2001, 47-8: “we know that it would be very imprudent to deny all animality 
access to forms of sociality in which guilt, and therefore procedures of reparation, even of mercy – begged or granted 
– are implicated in a very differentiated way. There is no doubt an animal thank you or mercy. You know that certain 
animals are just as capable of manifesting what can be interpreted as an act of war, an aggressive accusation, as they are 
capable of manifesting guilt, shame, discomfort, regret, anxiety in the face of punishment, and so forth. I am sure you 
have seen shameful animals, animals giving all the signs of ‘feeling guilty’, thus of remorse and regret, and animals 
fearing judgment or punishment, animals hiding or exposing themselves to reproach or chastisement. One also knows 
that in the often-overloaded symbolism of combat or war, of fights between animals, well, that movements and even rites 
of reconciliation, of the interruption of hostility, of peace, even of mercy, of mercy begged and granted, are possible. The 
moment an animal is, I would say, at the mercy of another, it can admit to being defeated and make signs that put it at 
the mercy of the other who then sovereignly grants it its life unharmed as a sign of peace. Certain animals make war and 
peace. Not all, not always, but neither do men. So, without confusing everything and without erasing all sorts of ruptures 
that arise with the articulation of a verbal language, one cannot deny this possibility, even this necessity of extra-verbal 
forgiveness, even un-human [anhumain] forgiveness”.
18   See Frans De Waal, Peacemaking Among Primates, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989.
19   See The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 254–6 and 282–3, where Derrida sketches a difficult reading of Walten “in” 
Austrag. Derrida comments upon the following passage from Martin Heidegger: Identität und Differenz, Pfullingen, 
Verlag Günther Neske, 1957, 63: “Im Austrag waltet Lichtung des sich verhüllend Verschließenden, welches Walten das 
Aus- und Zuienander von Überkommnis und Ankunft vergibt”. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, Identity and Difference, New York, 
Harper & Row, 1969, 65: “Within this perdurance there prevails a dearing of what veils and closes itself off – and this its 
prevalence bestows the being apart, and the being toward each other, of overwhelming and arrival”.
experience”20.
This thesis is ontological as well as semantic: there is no reference to “world”. 
For this radical solipsism there is neither world, nor “world”: the unities of language and of the 
word are shattered. Every being, either a signified or a signifier, is not only idiomatic, radically singular, 
but also inconsistent in its being one. Idiom is neither semantic nor polysemous, but disseminated. We 
are facing a sort of radical Cratylism, which is the only coherent perspective for the mobilism of diffé-
rance. We, (“we”, so as to speak) share “no intelligible language”, no contract or synthéké, but only “an 
agreement inherited over millennia between living beings who are more or less anguished by illness, 
death and war…” Of course, one can confer a shared sense to the word and experience named “world”, 
but “there seems to be in this refined utilitarian nominalism nothing more than an animal ruse of life, a 
life common to the beast and the sovereign”21. 
The world is an idea in the Kantian sense, a fiction: it is as if (comme si, als ob) there were a world, 
some world. This fiction is healthy, even necessary, but pure, without alibi, without truth. The sense (of 
the world) is an animal ruse of life.
Thus Derrida reinscribes Kant’s teleologism and regulative idealism “in the service of a Nietz-
schean-type perspective and perspectivism”22. Derrida says to evoke this perspectivism “at least by 
analogy, for the moment”. But in the sixth session of the first year of the seminar he had embraced this 
perspective in a resolute fashion. In this context the French idiom “bêtise” undergoes the same semantic 
analysis as “world”, and turns out as well as not having a referent. In fact, as we have seen, such lack of 
reference is generalized. Derrida exposes this condition, characterising significance in general, human 
and beastly alike, by designating his use of his language (his French, his bêtise); better still, by letting 
this use be designated by itself. The primacy of pragmatics on semantics, of contextual historicity and 
of the living investment in signifying production over essence, sense, substance – this primacy is not 
proper to man. Life, as ruse, expresses itself in context: “the difference [here the one among different 
nuances of bêtise] can be felt and marked only in the concrete, situated, contextualized implementation, 
in the idiom of each situation and each individual”23. And since the context is impossible to saturate, this 
produces “a shibboleth effect” that “operates within”, à l’intérieur of language: a constitutive untransla-
tability. As Derrida says in Aporias, “il y va d’un certain pas”: of the step and pace, of the style “of the 
strolling man or animal” de “l’homme ou de l’animal marchant”24.
We share no “intelligible” language: this means that the ruse of life does not run through apop-
20   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 266.
21   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 267.
22   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II, 270.
23   Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, volume I, seminar 2001-02, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, Chicago and 
London, The University of Chicago Press, 2009, 170.
24   Jacques Derrida: Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993, 9 (trans. mod.); see 
Jacques Derrida: Apories, Paris, Galilée, 1993, 27.
hantic logos, but rather, as it were, through apophatic resources25; and that these feign, fashion the former, 
such as a regulative ideal. This does not mean that silence will take us there where voice cannot: to es-
sence. Rather, that some gesturality, that some idiotic pragmatics inhabits every voice and speech. This 
apophasis is not a via negativa, a path beyond finite conditions, but one that winds up at these conditions. 
And since these are what impedes – or disproves – access to essence, this access simply proves impos-
sible, or the quest for it senseless. But the path that unfolds upon them is not negative. Rather affirmative: 
of finitude, contextuality, materiality, etc.
III.
It is by working on the meanings of “bêtise”, and on the title of his seminar, that Derrida exposes the 
genealogy of this conception. Such is an exposition which is always and only affirmed “in action”, so to 
speak: producing itself in the act of its own description. Let us recall, like Derrida does, the “last crite-
rion” of his operation: “to keep bringing us back to this first site of decision as to the immense question 
of the living” and “of the relation between what is proper to the so-called animal living being and what 
is proper to the so-called human living being, namely the experience of language, sign, or speech, of 
manifestation and comprehension, interpretation, etc.”26.
What doest “bêtise” mean?
Let us have Derrida reel off for us some of the meanings of this vocabulary entry. 
a) Bêtise maybe “the proper to man, […] the proper appropriating itself, the proper positing itself, 
the proper appropriated to itself, autoposited, the appropriation or the fantasy of the proper, wherever it 
comes about”27. In this description we recognise the figure, sketched in the seminar, of the virile fetish 
of erection. But also the definition of the Walten and of every sovereign mastery. 
b) But bêtise is not proper to man, not limited to it. It comes about everywhere. Therefore:
“at bottom what is irreducibly bête […] is life pure and simple, which is both infinitely 
bête and cunning [rusée]: it is the living in life itself which outplays the opposition bet-
ween bêtise and its supposed contrary, both in what is called man and in what is called 
the animal. Nietzsche is doubtless one of the most eloquent witnesses on this theme”28.
Life, as concerns every living being, is bête. Meaning, sense, sovereignty, the proper, are its ruse.
c) Therefore, the use of every lexicon and first of all of bêtise “is not constative but performative”, 
and “depends upon an incalculable number of conditions that makes it impossible to master such per-
25   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 168.
26   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 176.
27   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 139.
28   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 176.
formative”. By using a phenomenological distinction which he had highlighted forty years before, in his 
introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, Derrida concludes that the lexicon of bêtise – which is to 
say the lexicon of life – is composed by bound or enchained significations. This is so because no “free, 
detached, unbound” ideality, no transcendent rule exists which would permit to saturate the incalculable 
context of the evaluations upon which every logos dwells29. 
d) Bêtise and its lexicon, then, are not “free”: they do not respond properly or freely. They are also, 
consequently, intimately reactional: 
“A meaning the ideality of which is bound determines a language that participates as 
much in reaction [...] as in response. If meaning remains linked to a determinate situation, 
a war-like or polemical pragmatics, for example, an engagement and a vital investment(of 
whatever nature: libidinal, hunting, or seductive), to a relation of forces, then the distinc-
tion between reaction and response loses its rigor and decidability”30.
e) Bêtise, the beast together with its lexicon are always strategically situated, chained, grabbed in the 
perspective of a vital investment, of an orexis and of its force. But this is not the sovereign force of 
Walten. It is always a differential force, resulting from the integration of a differential element which 
has no unity nor totality: from a will to power (or simply from some puissance). Such a conception of 
force is also implied by the logic of the unconscious and by the hypothesis of “drives to power that are 
essentially divisible”31.
“If one does not wish to invoke Freud’s authority and discursivity, it suffices to admit 
that the living being is divisible and constituted by a multiplicity of agencies, forces and 
intensities that are sometimes in tension or even in contradiction” (181),and which “is 
bound to localize – or localize itself within – different agencies, of which some resist 
others, oppress or suppress others, trying to implement and have what we shall call, so as 
to not forget La Fontaine, the reason of the strongest prevail”32.
What is here implied is a physiology of sovereignty founded on dissimulation, on a fictional and auto-fic-
tional power, on a fabulous performativity which also informs the parade of the majestic erection of the 
sovereign, as well as his legitimating tropes.
f) Bêtise is also the origin of the poetical:
“the fact that the context (the pragmatic situation) determines in such a constraining fa-
shion each time the meaning of the word bête or bêtise means that the privilege of the 
idiom, which can be the privilege of poetry, […] the privilege of the unique event of lan-
29   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 177–178.
30   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 179.
31   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 291.
32   Jacques Derrida: The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. I, 183.
guage that one calls for example poetic invention – this doesn’t merely mean the poem, 
it also means a certain contamination by what we attribute to so-called reactive or reac-
tional animality”33.
The poem is animal. At least, not otherwise than animal or bestial.
By the example of expression, and of a presently enacted expression, bêtise, another conception of 
nature and of idiom is therefore sketched. Between or entre the sovereign and the beast. Heidegger pro-
posed a perspective that tied together: 1) logos, 2) Walten, 3) Dasein. Derrida responds with a perspective 
that ties together: 1) a bound idiom, one that does not mean anything; 2) a physiology of a will to power 
or of a drive for domination that designate their own failure or impasse while applying to themselves; 3) 
the bestial ruse of finite living beings.
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